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THE MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
settled; but the grouping of the facts under a stated theory may be diffi-
cult. "The essential point in this regard is that the article should
reach the ultimate consumer or user subject to the same defect as it
had when it left the manufacturer . . .At most, there might in other
cases be a greater difficulty of proof of the fact."' 0 Once the legal
relations are adequately proved, there is more than ample authority
to believe that recovery will lie.
CHESTER JOHN NIEBLER.
BANKRUPTCY-PROCEEDINGS UNDER SECTION 77B-VOLUNTARY
PETITION FILED BY A DISSOLVED CORPORATION.-Section 77B of the
Bankruptcy Act has been in effect for almost four years.' Section 77
was adopted a year earlier.' The general scheme of each section is the
same. Bankruptcy courts are authorized to protect the assets of certain
corporation-debtors from the processes usually available to creditors,
not merely as a preliminary step in a controlled liquidation of assets,
but to preserve the assets and to permit the working out of a plan for
reorganization which may include participation by stockholder groups
in the future operation of the properties.&3 Each court has wide terri-
torial jurisdiction.4 Eventually the particular court will have to consider
the fairness of any proposed plan for reorganization and must confirm
it before the plan can be put into effect. The constitutionality of this
general scheme was considered in Continental Bank v. C. R. I & P.
Ry. Co.5 The Supreme Court held that Section 77 was a bankruptcy
8OGrant v. Australian Knitting Mills, [1936] A.C. 85, 106. See, Bourcheix v.
Willowbrook Dairy, 268 N.Y. 1, 196 N.E. 617 (1935).
'48 STAT. 912 (1934), 49 STAT. 965 (1935), 50 STAT. 622 (1937), 11 U.S.C.A.
§ 207-(1937).
247 STAT. 1474 (1933), 49 STAT. 911 (1935), 49 STAT. 1969 (1936), 11 U.S.C.A.
§ 205 (1937).
a The principal reason for enacting Section 77B was probably to provide a
scheme for preserving stockholders' equities. But the Section has been used by
creditors as well as by stockholders and to promote reorganizations in which
stockholder groups have not been interested. It has been used by secured credi-
tor groups to facilitate their reaching the properties covered by their security
devices and to permit them to avoid having to resort to the usual processes of
foreclosure. In re Church Street Bldg. Corp'n., 299 U.S. 24 (1936); In re
Witherbee Court Corp'n., 88 F. (2d) 251 (C.C.A. 2d, 1937). It has been used
by one group of creditors to force recognition by other groups of creditors of
interests which might have been endangered by a foreclosure sale or by a con-
tinuation of the foreclosure receivership. In re Knickerbocker Hotel Co., 81
F. (2d) 981 (C.C.A. 7th, 1936).
* See Subsection (a) of the statute; see also (1937) 21 MARQ. L. REv. 87; Texas
Co. v. Hauptman, 91 F. (2d) 449 (C.C.A. 9th, 1937).
* 294 U.S. 648 (1935). The statute provides in Subsection (b) that any plan must
be submitted before confirmation for approval by prescribed majorities of
each class of creditors and stockholders that will be affected by the plan. In
any event no plan is to be confirmed which is not fair and feasible. [Subsec-
tion (f).] Provision is also made for approval on condition where the pre-
scribed majorities to not consent. [Subsection (b) (4) and (5).] It is sug-
gested here that protests against confirmation of particular plans are not likely
to be decided on "constitutional" grounds. See Downtown Investment Co. v.
Boston Metropolitan Bldg., 81 F. (2d) 314, 323 (C.C.A. 1st, 1936). The Court
has already approved the general plan of the Section. The confirming of any
plan that is not fair and feasible is an abuse of discretion. See Tennessee
Publishing Co. v. American Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 18 (1936).
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statute and that it was covered by the bankruptcy clause of the Constitu-
tion. That decision anticipated and settled the same question of consti-
tutionality as it might have been presented in a case under Section 77B.
Recently the Supreme Court has decided that a dissolved corpora-
tion lacks capacity to file a voluntary original petition to put this
scheme in motion.6 In the particular case the debtor-corporation had
been dissolved by the local courts on a motion by a state official because
the corporation had failed to pay its franchise tax." When the original
petition was filed for approval the corporation's properties were still in
the control of a receiver appointed by a state court in a foreclosure
action. The two-year period prescribed by the local statute for the
winding up of the corporation's affairs had expired. The court which
had approved the debtor's original petition appointed a temporary
trustee to administer the property and refused to dismiss the proceed-
ings on the motion of certain secured creditors. The court's order was
affirmed by the circuit court of appeals. The decree of the appellate
court was reversed by the Supreme Court. Mr. Justice Sutherland,
speaking for the Court, said that a corporation which had been "put
to death by the state" could not be recognized by the bankruptcy courts
on a voluntary petition filed under Section 77B.
The Court did not consider what the record showed with respect to
the "good faith" of the stockholder groups who had caused the petition
to be filed. Nor did the Court consider the matter of penalizing a cor-
porate group where dissolution had been brought about because the
corporation had violated some local regulatory statute. The Court was
not impressed by the showing that the old corporate assets were still
undisposed of and still within the reach of the court which had
approved the debtor's petition.
There are statements in the opinion which indicate that the stock-
holder groups, who had purported to act for the debtor, had never
been interested in the corporation when it was a going concern. They
had "purchased" the old stockholders' interests after the corporation
had been dissolved, after the receiver had been appointed in the fore-
closure proceedings, and after Section 77B was enacted by Congress.
A petition filed by a debtor dominated by speculators perhaps has not
been filed in good. faith._ Although the original petition has been
6 Chicago T. & T. Co. v. Forty-One Thirty-Six W. Bldg. Corp'n., 58 Sup. Ct.
125 (1937), with a dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Cardozo.
7 See the opinion of the circuit court of appeals in the same case. In re Forty-
One Thirty-Six Wilcox Bldg. Corp'n., 86 F. (2) 667, 668 (C.C.A. 7th, 1937).
8 See Subsection (a) of the statute. Cf. In re Knickerbocker Hotel Co., 81 F.(2d) 981 (C.C.A. 7th, 1936).
9 When the question of "good faith" is raised in connection with the approval
of the original petition the court is not concerned with the feasibility of any
proposed plan. If there is any probability that the debtor may realize anything
out of future operations the opportunity should be afforded the stockholder
groups to make the attempt to reorganize. R. L. Witters Ass'n. v. Ebsary Gyp-
sum Co., 93 F. (2d) 746 (C.C.A. 5th, 1938). Nor does the court after approving
the petition have to permit the debtor to operate the properties, particularly
if they are already in the control of a state court receiver. See In re Tennessee
Publishing Co., 81 F. (2d) 463 (C.C.A. 6th, 1936). But the court may be
sufficiently well informed of the company's condition when the original peti-
tion is filed for approval that the court will conclude that reorganization by
stockholder groups is hopeless. In re Griggsby-Grunow Co., 77 F. (2d) 200
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approved ex parte, on a motion by petitioning creditors and the show-
ing of these facts, the court would be justified in dismissing the pro-
ceedings. In any event, even if the stockholder groups, now interested
in the debtor, had been stockholders when the concern was a going
concern, the court which had originally approved the petition might
upon motion of the petitioning creditors dismiss the proceedings. The
court might feel that no stockholder group would ever be able to gain
consent of any considerable number of creditors to any plan of
reorganization with recognition of stockholder interests. Even at this
time the court might be satisfied that no such plan would be fair.'
Moreover, as a matter of policy, the court which had approved the
petition might have chosen to dismiss the proceedings, or the Supreme
Court might have directed a dismissal, because it would be ready to
decide that a corporation which had been dissolved for violation of a
regulatory statute might be penalized although the corporation's assets
were still unliquidated and although the statutory period for adminis-
tration had not yet expired.
It was "too easy" for the Court to decide the case as it did. A
"dead" corporation cannot act! The Court was willing to concede that
creditor groups might choose to have the unliquidated assets of a dis-
solved corporation preserved in a proceeding under Section 77B.
Involuntary original petitions have been approved." Experience in
bankruptcy cases under the older provisions of the Act indicates that
a dissolved corporation may be insolvent and that its director-
administrators may have committed acts of bankruptcy.' A dissolved
corporation has been adjudged a bankrupt even on a voluntary petition
under the older provisions of the Act.- However, a proceeding under
Section 77B is not purportedly a liquidating proceeding. The probabil-
ity of a successful preservation and reorganization with advantages for
stockholders where a dissolved corporation is also insolvent is not
great. A solvent corporation's assets perhaps should be liquidated when
(C.C.A. 7th, 1935). Or the court may discover that the debtor's properties are
beyond reach of its process and may then dismiss the proceedings before any
plan is proposed. Manati Sugar v. Mack, 75 F. (2d) 284 (C.C.A. 2d, 1935).
1On re 211 East Delaware Place Bldg. Corporation, 76 F. (2d) 834 (C.C.A.
7th, 1935). In a case like the principal case the probability of the court's being
able to approve an involuntary petition over opposition of other creditors or
stockholders is not great. The debtor could hardly have committed an act of
bankruptcy within the prescribed time, and the existing foreclosure receiver-
ship would not be an equity receivership within the meaning of the statute.
Duparquet v. Evans, 297 U.S. 216 (1936). Two of the circuit courts of appeals
have been willing to uphold approval by district courts of voluntary peti-
tions filed by dissolved corporations under Section 77B. In neither case was
there any statutory time limit on the period for administration of the dissolved
corporation's assets. Capital Endowment Co. v. Kroeger, 86 F. (2d) 976
(C.C.A. 6th, 1936); Old Fort Improvement Co. v. Lea, 89 F. (2d) 286 (C.C.A.
4th, 1937).
a1See Hammond v. Lyon Realty Co., 59 F. (2d) 592 (C.C.A. 4th, 1932) ; Austin
v. Thomas, 78 F. (2d) 602 (C.C.A. 6th, 1935), discussed in (1935) 20 MARQ.
L. Rxv. 42.
'Partan v. Niemi, 288 Mass. 111, 192 N.E. 527, 97 A.L.R. 473 (1934). Where
the dissolution was voluntary and when the corporation was purportedly
solvent the directors cannot thereafter have the corporation adjudicated a
bankrupt on its voluntary petition. Vassar Foundry Co. v. Whiting Corpora-
tion, 2 F. (2d) 241 (C.C.A. 6th, 1924).
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the corporation has been dissolved for cause. But to declare that the
corporation is ineligible to file a voluntary petition because it is "dead"
is to overlook the problems in the case, and to fix a precedent which
the Court will limit in future decisions. In the state where this
corporation was organized and where it did business its "existence"
could have been preserved until the state court had finally disposed of
the foreclosure action1 3
VERNON X. MILLER.
13 Singer & Talcott Stone Co. v. Hutchinson, 176 II. 48, 51 N.E. 622 (1898);
Graham & Morton Transportation Co. v. Owens, 165 II. App. 100 (1911).
1938] NOTES
